

HotFuzz

Discovering Algorithmic Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities
through Guided Micro-Fuzzing

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

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1988




2020 Fuzz Testing



Seed Inputs



Fuzzer (AFL, LibFuzzer)



Program Under Test




Crashing Inputs


Algorithmic Complexity (AC) Bugs



We observed computing the total price of your cart can take 4 ½ months!




HotFuzz



HotFuzz Micro-Fuzzing

```
class A {  
    public method(B b, C c);  
}
```



Micro-Fuzzing

`a, b, c = TestHarness(method)`

$a \xleftarrow{R} A$

$b \xleftarrow{R} B$

$c \xleftarrow{R} C$

`a.method(b, c)`




AC Sanitization

Threshold T


`Runtime(a.method(b, c)) ≤ T`

 `Runtime(x.method(y, z)) > T`



Micro-Fuzzing




A.method(B, C)
Method Under Test



Genetic Algorithm



Instantiating Seed Inputs



Identity Value Instantiation (IVI)

$$X = 0$$

Small Recursive Instantiation (SRI)

$$X \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{\alpha}{3}\right)$$


`new D(int)`

`new A(D, E)`

`a.method(b, c)`


Synthesizing Test Cases

```
new D(10)    new E("a")
  |          /
  v         v
new A(D, E)
  |
  v
a.method(b, c)
public static void main(String argv){
```



```
}
```

Micro-Fuzzing Evaluation



Library	No. Methods	AC Bugs Detected			AC Bugs Confirmed			Methods Covered			Throughput	
		Both	IVI	SRI	Both	IVI	SRI	Both	IVI	SRI	IVI	SRI
JRE	91,632	6	8	13	5	8	13	23,818	2,780	1,439	4,389,675	3,092,866
STAC	67,494	34	6	15	5	0	0	8,064	847	1,162	3,608,741	3,172,502
Maven	239,777	46	38	56	46	38	56	66,987	2,622	1,770	5,906,687	5,591,106

AC Vulnerability in the JRE

```
import java.math.BigDecimal;
```

```
BigDecimal x = new BigDecimal(s);  
BigDecimal y = new BigDecimal(t);
```

```
x.add(y);
```

If an adversary can influence the value of s or t, they can trigger DoS.

Computing

```
new BigDecimal("1E2147483647").add("1E0");
```

Takes at least an hour to complete on every major implementation of the JVM!

Impact of BigDecimal Findings

- Affects all widely used JVM implementations
- Disclosed our findings to 3 vendors
- IBM J9
 - Proof of Concept (PoC) terminates after running for 4 ½ months
 - Issued us a CVE for our findings
- Oracle OpenJDK
 - PoC runs in an hour
 - Credited us in a Security-in-Depth Issue
- Google Android
 - PoC takes over 24 hours to run
 - Stated the issue falls outside their definition of DoS vulnerabilities

Summary

- Introduced Micro-Fuzzing
- Presented HotFuzz
 - Prototype implementation of micro-fuzzing for Java libraries
 - Automatically detects AC bugs
- Introduced strategies for generating seed inputs for micro-fuzzing
 - IVI ... Identity Value Instantiation
 - SRI ... Small Recursive Instantiation
- Micro-fuzzing detected 158 AC bugs in our evaluation artifacts
- Showed how an AC bug in production code can trigger DoS

Thank you!